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The rise of the Austrian Freedom Party
(FPÖ) in the last two decades has been a re-
markable chapter in European politics. This is
not just the story of a previously marginal po-
litical force gaining a bigger share of the Aus-
trian political cake. The rise of the FPÖ also
resulted in considerable controversy and end-
less theorizing about the party’s democratic cre-
dentials and the role of its former party leader
Jörg Haider. After gaining 27% of the vote in
the 1999 general election, fevered anxiety en-
sued in the media about a Nazi ‘revival’ in Aus-
tria and there was an international outcry about
the decision of the Austrian People’s Party
(ÖVP) to share power with Haider’s party in a
government coalition. Massive demonstrations
took place in Vienna and the fourteen other
European Union countries imposed an unprec-
edented sanctions regime on a fellow member
state. The precipitous fall in the popularity of
the FPÖ has been equally dramatic since they
joined a government coalition in 2000. At the
time of writing this article their national vote
has dropped to 10.01%, with a real prospect of
dropping even further.
The political success of Haider’s FPÖ pro-
duced a prolific amount of scholarship. This
article describes and critically examines some
of this literature and then puts forward a differ-
ent perspective on the ‘Haider Phenomenon’. It
will state that a key element of Haider’s politi-
cal strategy was to address anti-modernist no-
tions of ‘tradition’ held by many ordinary peo-
ple and construct his own version of Austrian
patriotism. Thus, while Haider was seen by some
scholars as being at the forefront of ‘moderniz-
ing’ Austrian politics out of the inertia of
Proporz or by others as ruthlessly exploiting
issues like immigration and crime to gain a
populist vote – he was also appealing to a deeply
rooted parochialism in Austrian society and
political culture. Haider recognized that an apa-
thetic electorate would respond to his rhetoric
of making the FPÖ vote synonymous with vot-
ing for an Austrian Heimat (homeland). He drew
on a rich tradition of anti-modernism, political
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conservatism and ambivalent national identity
in Austria in order to forge a new and vigorous
political force that promised more “order, tradi-
tion, identity and security” (Diamond/Gunther
2001) in the precarious world of post-commu-
nism and Austria’s integration into the European
Union.
Evidence of Haider’s use of tradition in his
political strategy can be traced by analyzing two
areas. Firstly, in the political culture underpin-
ning the Austrian system since 1945 with its
unique blend of consensus, an advanced wel-
fare system and a suppression of identities once
widespread in Austria before 1938 – especially
that of pan-Germanism (Pelinka 1994, 169).
Secondly, in the FPÖ’s anti-modernist political
rhetoric, with its appeal to conservative values,
tradition and the establishment of a new type of
Austrian Heimat. Haider managed a clever strat-
egy of adjusting the political message accord-
ing to his different audiences (Ötsch 2000).
Before expanding on these points, I shall set the
scene by reviewing the scholarship on Haider
already available. My contribution should be
treated as an Ergänzung to current academic lit-
erature, not a revision.
Views of Haider
I have chosen two categories of analysis
from the abundant literature that is now avail-
able on the ‘Haider Phenomenon’. Firstly, I will
review those authors who explain Haider’s suc-
cess more in a structural context, i.e. stemming
from a deep disillusionment among many Aus-
trians with the politics of Proporz and the domi-
nation of political and civil institutions by the
SPÖ and ÖVP. In this context, Haider’s FPÖ
represents the modernization of Austrian poli-
tics and the breaking of old political cleavages.
The other view of Haider comes from writers
who, while recognizing the obvious structural
dynamics of the FPÖ’s political breakthrough,
also emphasize Haider as being a symptom of
Austria’s failure to deal with its National So-
cialist legacy and the promotion of Austria as
the ‘victim’ of Nazi aggression rather than its
willing accomplice. Here, Haider represents the
ugly face of a reactionary Austrian political cul-
ture that should be dealt with through a combi-
nation of resistance and education (Pelinka
2002a, 227).
The more general scholarship on the recent
rise of the ‘Far-Right’ in Europe (Eismann 2002)
serves as a general context for studying Haider’s
FPÖ. It deals with factors such as voter apathy,
the disillusionment of ordinary people with poli-
tics, the failure of mainstream parties to deal
with issues such as immigration or the march of
neo-liberalism. All these issues are relevant to
the FPÖ’s political progress in the 1990s, how-
ever in this article I shall dwell on the more
Austrian-specific circumstances that propelled
the FPÖ into the position as Europe’s most suc-
cessful far-right political party.
The authors included in the first category
focusing on the structural context – are Kurt
Luther (University of Keele), Melanie Sully
(Diplomatic Academy, Vienna) and Lothar
Höbelt (University of Vienna).
Kurt Richard Luther and Melanie Sully see
Haider as representing the ‘normalization’ and
‘modernization’ of Austrian politics after dec-
ades of domination by the two main political
parties. Although this system might have
brought a necessary stability in the post war
period, by the 1980s it was clear that Proporz
and the post-war Austrian consensus were be-
ginning to crumble and were in need of politi-
cal reform. Haider deftly formulated an opposi-
tion that had considerable resonance with the
Austrian public. For Luther, this ‘structural op-
position’ lies at the core of the Freedom Party’s
ideology rather than its purported ‘right-wing
extremism’:
the element of continuity (or ‘core’) of the Freedom
Party’s ideology may well reside not in right-wing
extremism but in the party’s structural opposition to
Austria’s post-war system (Luther 2000, 23).
He states in the conclusion of his article
‘Austrian Democracy Under Threat from the
Freedom Party?’ that “the Freedom Party is
neither a neo-fascist, neo-Nazi, nor right-wing
extremist party (…) (no) such values govern the
operation, or political goals of the party” (ibid.
27).
The Rise of the Austrian Freedom Party in the 1990s 299
Luther notes that despite the various asso-
ciations with Nazism within the party, the infa-
mous neo-Nazi utterances of Haider or the xeno-
phobic rhetoric of other party members, the FPÖ
have contributed to a ‘normalization’ of Aus-
trian politics that represent:
a shift from a system of party competition
characterized by hyper stability and accommodation
to one in which uncertainty and competition are the
order of the day (…) in some respects (this develop-
ment) can be regarded as a ‘normalization’ of the
Second Republic’s party system (Luther 1998, 151).
By focusing on the oppositional aspect of
the FPÖ and placing this in the context of the
post-war Austrian political system, Luther cor-
rectly points to a central problem with the
continued success of the party once it achieved
executive power in February 2000:
the transition (from opposition to government) is
likely to prove especially difficult for a party such
as the FPÖ which for so many years and so
successfully pursued a strategy of populist agitation
(Luther 2001, 28).
In her book, ‘The Haider Phenomenon’,
Melanie Sully also puts Haider at the centre of
Austria’s “painful process of modernization”
(1997, 204). She points to the role of Haider in
playing a “radical anti-establishment card” in
Austrian politics, an establishment dominated,
according to Sully, by “1968-vintage pseudo-
left Viennese intellectuals” (ibid. 37). Haider’s
success is therefore partly due to a failure of the
Austrian Left to reform and modernize the Sec-
ond Republic before 1986. She draws on the
work of Menasse (ibid. 199) to show that Haider
took up the gauntlet of critique of the Austrian
system that the Left had failed to put into prac-
tice. The Left’s subsequent ‘hysterical’ anti-
Haider stance focused only on the apparent ‘fas-
cism’ of the FPÖ while ignoring the crucial proc-
ess of normalization in an “ordinary western
democracy” (ibid. 200).
For Sully, Haider incorporates a “potpourri”
of ideas from all sides of the political spectrum
in his project of change for Austria. The FPÖ is
an important force of modernization, capable
of breaking the old cleavages of an outdated
Austrian post-war political system:
Haider’s project to change Austria is built on a
potpourri of ideas from the right and the left, from
neo-liberalism economics, conservative slogans and
old socialist rhetoric. It is radical and also
conservative (ibid. 201).
The Austrian historian Lothar Höbelt de-
scribes Haider in his recent book, ‘Defiant Popu-
list: Jörg Haider and the Politics of Austria’, as
a “harbinger of change against a system of
power-sharing (Proporz) that was all-pervasive”
(2003, 212). He adds that when Haider turned
the FPÖ into a populist party, the “old guard”
became “increasingly irrelevant”. On the one
hand these long-standing party members were
relieved at the rejuvenation of the FPÖ, but they
were also perturbed about developments and
events that they had “kick-started but no longer
controlled” (ibid. 61) after making Haider their
party leader in 1986. For Höbelt, a key element
of Haider’s political strategy was to provoke and
mobilize an apathetic Austrian electorate into
registering their disgust with the ‘system’ by
voting for the FPÖ. Haider had managed to cap-
ture a new phenomenon in Austrian electoral
politics – “the swing vote” (ibid. 154).
Referring to the “Nazi question mark” that
hangs over Haider, Höbelt reckons that Haider
made a political gamble by being too ‘outspo-
ken’ on taboo issues stemming from Austria’s
past in order to gain domestic support. It led to
the image of Haider as a neo-Nazi in the heart
of European politics, endangering democracy.
As a result of these ‘gaffes’, it became subse-
quently impossible for Haider to take part in
government politics after dabbling in such his-
torical revisionism: “Once he had started in that
direction, however, it was difficult for him
(Haider) to turn back” (ibid. 155).
For the view of those authors who see Haider
more as a threat to Austrian democracy than
those in the first category, I have selected from
books and articles by Wolfgang Neugebauer
(Dokumentationsarchiv des österreichischen
Widerstandes), Ruth Wodak (University of Vi-
enna) and Anton Pelinka (University of Inns-
bruck).
Neugebauer presents a convincing case for
making Haider firmly responsible for shifting
the FPÖ from the more liberal agenda under the
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leadership of Norbert Steger in the 1980s to-
wards the “racism and right-wing extremism”
that marked out the Haider era (Neugebauer/
Bailer 1996; Neugebauer/Bailer 1998). He
shows that many components of extreme-right
wing policies can be directly applied to ‘Haider’s
movement’ (Neugebauer/Bailer 1998, 172).
For Neugebauer, Haider’s promotion of him-
self as a “statesman” and “Austrian patriot” is
simply a camouflage to deceive the public about
“the consistently pan-Germanic, and in the last
instance, anti-Austrian, basic stance of the FPÖ
(and) to mobilize or utilize xenophobic attitudes
in the population” (ibid. 169). The extreme-right
margins of Austrian politics have warmed to the
FPÖ since Haider became party leader in 1986
and were subsequently integrated into the party
(ibid. 166). Thus, while Haider was busy mobi-
lizing mainstream support amongst the wider
electorate there was a parallel process of an in-
creasingly active and vocal faction of neo-Nazi
elements within the party.
Ruth Wodak has made a detailed scrutiny of
the language and rhetoric of Haider (Wodak et
al. 1999). By focusing on the discourse of
Haider’s FPÖ, she shows the way in which
Haider manipulated language in order to con-
struct a new type of national identity that polar-
izes the population, creating a divisive society
composed of “good guys” (white, Germanic
Austrians) and “bad guys” (the rest, particularly
brown-skinned, Jews etc.) (Wodak 2002, 40).
Haider plays on the prejudices already held by
many Austrians and turned them into political
capital. He made a new assessment of Austria’s
‘past, present and future’ (Wodak 2000) by pos-
tulating in his political rhetoric who he thinks
are the echt, anständig und ordentlich citizens
of Austria.
Anton Pelinka has been a prolific writer on
Haider’s FPÖ. He accepts that the ‘moderniza-
tion’ of Austrian politics opened up a new sort
of political culture in Austria, however the sig-
nificance of this development lies in the fact the
“thoughts and actions of the underdogs (i.e. the
underclass) are increasingly right-wing”
(Pelinka 1998a, 117). Historically, this right-
wing ascendancy arose out of the “taboos and
self deception” in the “Second Republic’s re-
construction of history” (Pelinka 1997, 96). A
self-deception that is encapsulated in the ‘vic-
tim thesis’ promoted by post-war Austrian elites,
who portrayed Austria as the victim of Nazi
aggression rather than an active participant.
Pelinka locates Haider’s rise as resulting
from a series of crises in Austrian society since
the 1960s. These included the search for more
democracy in the 1960s, the decline of stability
in the 1980s and the impact of the international
and European agenda in the 1990s. As Pelinka
states, “all these crises together changed Aus-
trian society; and when the society and economy
changed, the political system had to change too”
(Pelinka 1998b, 213).
Austria has continued a tradition of histori-
cal ‘exceptionalism’ (Pelinka 2002b), to the
point where it is perceived as a country ‘outside
the European mainstream’ due to having the
most successful far-right party in Europe. For
Pelinka, in contrast to the general trend of right-
wing populism in Europe, the FPÖ has one cru-
cial difference – their specific roots in, and on-
going ambivalence towards, National Socialism.
Haider’s FPÖ is symptomatic of what Pelinka
terms as the ‘x-factor’ (ibid. 9) which denotes
Austria’s specific negligence in dealing with its
Nazi past, reflected in the FPÖ’s prominence in
Austrian politics. Thus, while this aspect of the
FPÖ was not necessarily the main factor in the
success of the FPÖ – it did not prevent 27 per-
cent of Austrians voting for them in 1999.
Another Perspective
By mostly falling into these two categories
of analysis, the scholarship on the rise of
Haider’s FPÖ has not focused enough on some
cultural-historical factors that have also had
considerable bearing on the success of right-
wing populism (or extremism) in Austrian main-
stream politics. I noticed this when, in the course
of my research, I came across the party’s ag-
gressive campaign against artists and intellec-
tuals in the early 1990s, which cumulated in an
election poster that appeared in Vienna during
1995 stating: “Lieben Sie Scholten, Jelinek,
Häupl, Peymann, Pasterk...oder Kunst und
The Rise of the Austrian Freedom Party in the 1990s 301
Kultur? Freiheit der Kunst statt sozialistischer
Staatskünstler” (Tieber 1996, 40). A statement
that has obvious connotations with the National
Socialist drive against ‘entartete Kunst’ in the
1930s, implying an FPÖ party policy of cen-
sorship and the promotion of a particular
‘healthy’ form of art. The ‘official’ intention of
the FPÖ was to attack the ‘wasted’ state subsi-
dies on artistic projects that no one likes, how-
ever the wider implications of this type of cam-
paign show a political party engaged in some
kind of latter-day Kulturkampf:
Vieles, was heute als Kunst ausgegeben, von der
öffentlichen Hand gefördert und von deren Vertre-
tern bejubelt wird, erregt Ekel und Ablehnung, die
soweit führen kann, daß mancher Bürger gar nichts
mehr von Kunst wissen will (Bleckmann 1996, 386).
No other right-wing populist party in Eu-
rope was prioritizing culture and aesthetics in
their political strategy to this extent, apart per-
haps from some cultural skirmishes stemming
from the regional politics of Le-Pen’s Front
National. Haider obviously thought he would
gain political capital out of an attack on artists
and cultural figures, I wished to uncover why
the issue of Kultur seemed to have such a reso-
nance and importance in mainstream Austrian
political culture.
In this ‘Kulturkampf’ of the 1990s, the FPÖ
attacked a newly constructed enemy – the ‘linke
Kulturmafia’. They took a moral high ground
on cultural issues of ‘taste’ in an attempt to ap-
peal to a general antipathy towards modern art,
the avant-garde and certain aspects of moder-
nity in the general population (Menasse 1997,
177). The venture into cultural politics by the
FPÖ was part of the overall populist strategy of
appealing to various constituencies in Austria
in order to increase electoral support. Haider
managed to package this critique of Kultur in
the Second Republic as part of his overall at-
tack on the ‘fossilized’ system of Proporz in
Austria. Apart from its populist appeal, I have
uncovered four other factors that underpin the
FPÖ’s inclusion of culture as an intrinsic part
of their populist political strategy in the 1990s.
Political Marriage: Reactionary conserva-
tive elements in the ÖVP found a natural ally in
the Kulturkampf of the FPÖ. Many in the ÖVP
could identify with a political campaign against
the Austrian avant-garde and their ‘left-wing
backers’. In addition, the moralistic stance of
‘upholding’ family values and ‘protecting’
decency within Austrian cultural production
could also be supported. Another example of
the newly found common ground between the
two parties was Haider’s alliance with the Catho-
lic church, which included a visit to the Pope in
December 2000 and a friendly relationship with
the bishop of St. Pölten, Kurt Krenn during the
1990s (Hofer 1998, 235). In this context the
marriage of these parties can be seen not only
as a neo-conservative political and economic
project but also as a moralistic cultural project
that aims at supporting a certain type of artistic
production at the expense of experimental con-
temporary art.
Targeting the Left: Haider singled out the
‘linke Kulturmafia’ as a political target. This was
a loose term for left-wingers, the avant-garde,
anti-fascists and the more progressive element
of the SPÖ – basically the most emphatic oppo-
nents of Haider. As Haider states in one of his
books:
Diesen Abschnitt in meinem Buch widme ich mei-




kritikern, Kulturgutverteidigern und all den ande-
ren kultivierten Menschen, die in der Vergangen-
heit einen Kult betrieben, sich als Teil einer Elite im
Lande von der Nicht-Elite abzusetzen. Und damit
vor allem von den Freiheitlichen (Haider 1997, 67).
Among the many artists, politicians and cul-
tural figures targeted in the 1990s were:
Hermann Nitsch, who was an example of
‘ugly’ and ‘disgusting’ contemporary art, which
has a sacrilegious content and ‘celebrates’ cru-
elty. Elfriede Jelinek is seen as ‘un-patriotic’,
obsessed with Austria’s national socialist past
and feminism. Claus Peymann was portrayed
as a typical ‘leftie’ intent on using his role as
director of the Burgtheater in order to promote
leftist propaganda or obscure avant-garde pro-
duction for selected elitist audiences. And
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Rudolf Scholten was singled out as a corrupt
SPÖ politician who supported and subsidized
experimental art during his tenure as Minister
for the Arts in the early nineties.
A War of Ideas: Underpinning the FPÖ
cultural rhetoric was a political theory seeking
to justify and explain the party’s Kulturkampf
in the 1990s. FPÖ Kulturkämpfer such as Walter
Marinovic and Andreas Mölzer borrowed and
adapted concepts from the writings of Antonio
Gramsci and transformed them into a rightist
critique of the apparent left-wing ‘hegemony’
that was dominating many Austrian institutions
(Zogholy 2001). A prime example of this left-
wing ‘takeover’ was the support and financial
assistance given by the Left to experimental
modern art in Austria. Haider introduced
Gramsci’s vocabulary of ‘hegemony’ into his
political writings and it became a staple part of
his oppositional discourse in the 1990s. As
Zöchling comments:
Kunst und Kultur sind für Haider der Angelpunkt,
die politische Hegemonie zu erlangen. Als Kärnt-
ner Landeshauptmann hat er sich als erstes das
Kunst- und Kulturressort geschnappt (Zöchling
1999, 156).
The Right-Wing Core: In its transforma-
tion into a populist political force, the FPÖ dis-
pensed with certain items of ideological bag-
gage. These included German nationalism i.e.
pan-Germanism, anti-clericalism and any overt
connections to National Socialism. New career
politicians emerged to prominence in the party
such as Susanne Riess-Passer and Karl-Heinz
Grasser, hungry for the status and privileges of
political power. Haider had to perform the deli-
cate balancing act of appealing to a wider elec-
torate and maneuvering for executive power
while placating an ideological right-wing core
of the party to prove that he had not given up
FPÖ ‘principles’. Haider became a chameleon,
attempting to appeal to all types of voters from
poor working-class families to entrepreneurs. Of
the various issues, certain ones like Kulturpolitik
had more of an appeal to these right-wing fun-
damentalists in the party – those who wished
for ‘healthy’ values to be re-established in a
society degenerated by the ’68 generation.
By appropriating Kultur as a political issue,
Haider was able to mobilize a historic tradition
of cultural parochialism more accentuated in
Austria than in other European countries – a tra-
dition that survived world wars, Nazism and
decades of liberal-democracy (Wimmer 1996).
It should be noted that Haider’s methods of po-
litical mobilization, in contrast to the content of
his rhetoric, were innovative and showed a dis-
tinct ability to exploit modern methods of po-
litical marketing. The term ‘parochialism’ has
no direct German translation, the nearest inter-
pretation being provinziell. Its basic meaning is
to have opinions, views or attitudes that are ‘re-
stricted or confined within narrow limits’. While
this phenomenon is obviously not restricted to
Austria, cultural parochialism has penetrated
mainstream politics to quite a significant degree
in Austria, enabling a fertile soil for the growth
of reactionary movements like Haider’s Free-
dom Party. This is reflected in the long-stand-
ing distaste for modern art amongst the Aus-
trian political establishment:
(…) Wobei ein Phänomen auftrat, das leider zu ei-
nem bestimmenden Element österreichischer Kul-
turgeschichte geworden ist: Borniert gegen moder-
ne Kunst gerichteter Aggression gelang es und ge-
lingt es durchaus immer wieder, die Welt der Krea-
tivität und des Geistigen zu beschädigen, Künstler
in ihrer Arbeit zu behindern und sie in ihrer materi-
ellen – und im Extremfall auch physischen – Existenz
zu gefährden und zu bedrohen (Denscher 1999, 5).
The tenacity of parochial attitudes in the
Austrian establishment can be attributed to the
historical, political and social forces that com-
bined during the twentieth century to shape
Austrian political culture in a different way from
other European countries. In Germany, the
trauma of Nazism was dealt with more rigor-
ously than in Austria, it was reflected by Ger-
man writers such as Böll or Grass who thema-
tized Nazism directly in their works (Konzett
2000, 10). Avant-garde culture was specifically
allocated space in public broadcasting, particu-
larly through initiatives like DCTP (Develop-
ment Company for Television Programme). In
Great Britain, political discourse has steered
clear of cultural matters and the flourishing
multiculturalism in the British art scene is in
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marked contrast to the narrow confines of Aus-
trian public art. Haider managed to use these
specific cultural factors in order to capture the
imagination of the Austrian electorate with a
new type of political program – based on ‘iden-
tity’ politics – and promising something ‘new’
and ‘radical’ while appealing to deeply con-
servative traditions and attitudes in Austrian
society. The next sub-section gives a deeper in-
sight into this specific Austrian political and
social climate that Haider inherited and ex-
ploited.
Austrian Identity
There is a deep tension in modernity between
those embracing the dynamic, liberal, techno-
logical, and cosmopolitan version of modernity
and the conservative reaction of those regret-
ting the ‘loss’ of cultural identity, religious be-
lief and hierarchical societal order. This anti-
modernist ideology crystallized itself in the fas-
cist movements of the 1930s. Austria has been
no exception to this conflict. In fact, as outlined
in Schorske’s (1980) classic work on Fin-de-
Siècle Vienna – Vienna became a hotbed of both
avant-garde radicalism and deeply reactionary
populism at the beginning of the 20th century.
The subsequent effects of two world wars, the
disintegration of the empire, the civil war in
1934 and Nazi occupation has had deep social
consequences. Amid all this political and social
turmoil, a deeply engrained parochialism in
Austrian elites, probably arising out of the trau-
mas of the first half of the 20th century, has re-
mained a constant feature of Austrian politics –
right up to the present-day. These political elites
– whether black or red – set up a progressive
social welfare system and practiced a remark-
able level of co-operation in government. How-
ever, at the same time, they were resistant to the
progressive social and cultural manifestations
of modernity and distinctly failed to ‘modern-
ize’ Austria in the cultural sense of the word.
Haider’s political project incorporated an
ideological undercurrent of cultural anti-mod-
ernism. While embracing neo-liberalism, com-
petitive party politics and eventually a coalition
with conservatism – it is clear from the party’s
stance on Kultur that it retained a deep suspi-
cion of any form of progressive cultural tenden-
cies. Cornelia Klinger highlights this tension in
her article titled ‘Fascism – a German Funda-
mentalism?’
Die Problematik des Faschismus hat weniger mit
dem Prozeß ‘sozialer’ Modernisierung zu tun als mit
dem Prozess ‘kultureller’ Modernisierung bzw. ih-
rer Verhinderung und Verfehlung (Klinger 1992).
In this context Ernst Hanisch (1994) has
sketched some illuminating aspects of the paro-
chial nature of post-war Austrian society. Dur-
ing the 1950s, the previous decades of instabil-
ity, war and dictatorship were overcome in the
cultural arena not by some kind of confronta-
tion or Vergangenheitsbewältigung – instead
there was the widely popular Heimatfilm – a
distinct manifestation of Austrian cultural pa-
rochialism:
Im Trivialfilm (Heimatfilm) (…) kristallisieren sich
die kollektiven Träume, das Imaginäre einer auf
Ruhe und Ordnung bedachten Gesellschaft aus.
Gegen die brutalen Zivilisationsbrüche der vorher-
gehenden Jahre, gegen die Technikeuphorie der
Gegenwart setzte der Heimatfilm auf eine ungestörte
Natur als Ort der Zuflucht, auf eine intakte konser-
vative Werthierarchie, wo die gesellschaftlichen
Ränge klar bestimmt, die Rolle von Mann und Frau
‘naturwüchsig’ ausformuliert werden (Hanisch
1994, 433).
Parallel to this ‘trivial’ culture, ‘high’ cul-
ture was dominated by the looming figure of
Herbert von Karajan. An undoubted master of
his art, but also a perfectionist who “mit einer
herrisch ungeduldigen Geste schob seine NS-
Verwicklung beiseite” (ibid. 434). The back-
ground to this conservative ‘Kulturparadigma’
was a nation putting the bulk of its energy into
economic reconstruction, in which there was
little effort made to bring back exiled Jewish or
communist artists and intellectuals. As Michael
Wimmer states in his article, the cultural poli-
cies of the post-war era primarily involved a
“cultural policy of exclusion” (1996, 42).
The main political parties established a sys-
tem of ‘Consociationalism’ (Pelinka 1998b, 15),
giving Austria decades of stable coalition gov-
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ernments and compliant trade unions. The po-
litical turmoil, economic difficulties and civil
unrest prevalent in other European countries,
particularly in the 1960s, were notably absent
in Austria. Pope Paul VI famously called the
country “the land of the blessed” during a visit
to the Vatican by the Austrian President, Franz
Jonas, in 1971. The extent of the Austrian es-
tablishment’s ‘Kompromissbereitschaft’ after
the war was the ‘pragmatic’ policy of integrat-
ing numerous ex-Nazis into the SPÖ and ÖVP
as well as allowing the embryonic version of
the FPÖ – the VdU (Verband der Unabhängigen)
to become a political party. The VdU explicitly
aimed to serve (as stated in 1949), amongst other
constituencies, the “respected and unin-
criminated representatives of the interests of
registered National Socialists” (Riedlsperger
1978, 40).
Right up to the 1980s, Austria managed to
sustain political and economic ‘stability’. In the
cultural arena, an image of wonderful land-
scapes, Mozart and of being the ‘first victim’ of
Nazi aggression in Europe was successfully ex-
ported. The only significant response to this be-
nign construction of Austrian identity came from
a few writers and artists. Amongst others, Tho-
mas Bernhard, Peter Handke, and Elfriede
Jelinek wrote polemics, plays and novels that
tore down the hypocritical facade of the Second
Republic (Konzett 2000). In the plastic arts, Vi-
ennese Actionism exposed the fault line of moral
hypocrisy and repression in Austrian society with
outrageous artistic ‘happenings’ (Fellner 1997).
However, the Kulturrevolution of the 1960s ac-
tually changed very little in Austrian political
culture. If anything, the conservative Right could
characterize this artistic challenge to the politi-
cal order as the outpourings of ‘Nest-
beschmutzer’ – whose intent it was to de-stabi-
lizing the hard won moral, political and eco-
nomic foundations of the post-war Austrian state.
Underlying and contributing to the conserva-
tive Kulturparadigma that affected post-war
Austria was the vexed question of Austrian iden-
tity. As Pelinka states:
No other European country at the end of the 20th
century whose identity has changed so many times,
whose objective, as well as subjective, substance
has been altered so often and so significantly since
1800 (Pelinka 1998, 9).
Austrian identity after 1945 was a crucial
issue for political elites who had the task of post-
war re-construction and the formation of an
Austrian liberal-democracy. In a sense, the claim
on ‘Austrianness’ was up for grabs – and the
post-war Austrian establishment spared little
time in constructing a new national identity.
Peter Thaler (2001) notes in his book that the
Austrian case of “nation-building” after 1945
was a highly successful project resulting from
the “conscious efforts of elites” to build an Aus-
trian “nation” (2001, 1). This process from
above involved not only the formation of a dis-
tinctive political culture, it also entailed the de-
velopment of an explicitly ‘Austrianist’
historiography after 1945, which aimed at the
eradication of pan-German ideology and the
reinforcement of a new Austrian national iden-
tity. History books were re-written, based on a
highly selective interpretation of the past – with
the specific intention of giving historical cre-
dence to the notion of an independent Austrian
nationhood.
However, as Thaler notes, the flipside of this
successful political process was that Austrian
nation-building had its “foremost impact on
consciousness, but did not significantly affect
the general economic and cultural environment”
(ibid. 175). In other words, while the populace
identified with the Austrian state, this identifi-
cation came as a result of a process ‘from above’
– dependent on economic success and political
consensus. Deep-rooted changes in social and
cultural identity did not take place. The fate of
Austria’s Jewish population, the complicity of
Austrians in Nazi war crimes and the legacy of
Austro-fascism were pertinently avoided by
politicians, the media and academics for well
over a generation, right up to the Waldheim cri-
sis of 1986.
Enter Haider
Coinciding with the election of the contro-
versial Austrian president, Kurt Waldheim, Jörg
Haider entered the Austrian political stage by
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his dramatic and successful bid for party lead-
ership in 1986. He then embarked on his politi-
cal strategy of capturing the mood and imagi-
nation of the Austrian electorate by an empha-
sis on ‘identity’ politics and an appeal to ‘tradi-
tional values’ (Haider 1995; 1997). In this im-
portant respect, the main political parties were
unable to adapt to the new political landscape
of late-modernity. They were left behind by the
political dynamic of a brand of right-wing
populism that was particularly suited to the
Austrian conditions of cultural parochialism and
political stalemate. Haider managed to fill a psy-
chological vacuum in an Austrian society that
had failed to grasp the nettles of dealing with
the legacies of the past, reforming the Proporz
political system and the retention and promo-
tion of parochial cultural values, at the expense
of cosmopolitanism and inclusion. The FPÖ did
not offer Austrian people any real political al-
ternative – it merely carried on the established
political traditions that had remained unchal-
lenged by Austria’s political establishment since
1945 (Bauböck 2002, 249).
The way in which Haider managed to ‘cap-
ture the imagination’ of many Austrians can be
seen in three areas of Freedom Party policy:
Heimat, anti-modernism and traditional values.
Heimat translates into ‘homeland’ in Eng-
lish – an insufficient translation of a word with
significant cultural connotations in German. In
the regional elections of Carinthia (March
7, 2004), the FPÖ gained 42.4% of the vote and
Haider remained governor. In his election cam-
paign he has included the slogan: “Jörg Haider
heißt für mich: Heimat”, which continues:
“Volkskultur und Tradition haben mehr
Stellenwert als je zuvor”. This is a direct and
emotional appeal towards people’s cultural iden-
tity, used so effectively by Haider throughout
the 1990s. The FPÖ has constantly re-iterated
that this special identity was in danger of being
eroded – whether by immigrants, asylum seek-
ers, left-wing politicians, cultural figures, art-
ists or the European Union. Haider also appealed
to the deep-seated desire for belonging and iden-
tity that had been absent from the bureaucratic
and distant politics of the Second Republic – a
political culture that pertinently avoided issues
of identity by focusing on economics and wel-
fare. Haider’s success lay in as Isolde Charim
states, ‘redefining the passions that move a re-
gime’:
Darin besteht ihr größter Erfolg: Sie (die extreme
Rechte) hat – und sie ist weiterhin dabei –, das sym-
bolische Dispositiv der Zweiten Republik, jene „Lei-
denschaften, die ein Regime bewegen“, neu be-
stimmt (Charim 2001, emphasis added).
During the first few years of his leadership,
Haider led a successful grassroots campaign in
which many new party members were recruited
and political support was mobilized. He chose
unconventional channels of political mobiliza-
tion such as targeting young people in discos or
the older generation in ‘beer-tent’ gatherings
(Gingrich 2002, 69). Therefore, while Haider’s
FPÖ became increasingly identified with Nazi
revisionism and xenophobia in the international
context, within the domestic setting many saw
his party as representing the preservation and
promotion of traditional values and beliefs – an
Austrian Heimat.
A cultural rhetoric was expounded by the
party in which a ‘Kulturdeutsch’ identity was
specified as opposed to the ‘political’ German
identity:
Die Freiheitliche Bewegung betont die Zugehörig-
keit der Österreicher zu der durch ihre jeweilige
Muttersprache vorgegebenen Kulturgemeinschaft;
für die überwiegende Mehrheit der Österreicher also
die deutsche (FPÖ Parteiprogramm 1997, 32)
Haider propagated the notion that Austria
was in the throes of a rampant cosmopolitanism,
an Überfremdung that was eroding the ‘Aus-
trian’ way of life. He made the preservation and
support of a healthy ‘Volkskultur’ a central
plank of his political strategy during the 1990s
(Gratzer 1998).
The political journey embarked on by the
FPÖ under Haider was understood as a
hegemonic project in which Austrian politics
would come under the domination of the FPÖ
by appealing to people not only on the basis of
policies or sound bites but by affecting ordinary
people’s emotional world and instilling a sense
of fear that something was being ‘lost’ in the
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chaotic society of the late 20th century. In this
respect the FPÖ ventured further than any other
European far-right party, with the exception of
France’s Front National, into positioning itself
as being the ‘true’ representatives of a national
identity.
By 1999, the FPÖ represented a formidable
force in Austrian politics. A charismatic leader
had convinced his party and a third of the coun-
try’s electorate that the Freedom Party was the
only true alternative to the bankrupt politics of
the old political camps. Jörg Haider had indeed
captured a nation’s imagination – and almost
became chancellor in the process. This political
achievement would not have been possible with-
out the appropriation and transformation of
Austrian ‘identity’ and ‘tradition’ into burning
political issues.
Conclusion
In this article I have added some additional
pieces to the Haider jigsaw puzzle with the aim
of obtaining a fuller picture of this extraordi-
nary (and ongoing) political story. My goal has
been to highlight and emphasize some cultural,
historical and political factors that have been
overlooked in understanding the Haider phe-
nomenon. Haider was able to appropriate and
re-cast a new type of Austrian ‘identity’ based
on traditional, parochial and conservative forces
in Austria that had been left unchallenged by
the political elites of the Second Republic. It is
not enough to simply state that Haider’s FPÖ
was part of a ‘normalization’ or ‘modernization’
of the Austrian political system – if anything
the old system is pretty much intact with a new
type of conservative hegemonic control. It is also
too easy for the left to reject Haider as a ‘fas-
cist’, then to mobilize significant resistance, only
to inherit yet another ÖVP/FPÖ coalition in
2002. The only difference being that this time
round the FPÖ is the junior partner of the same
neo-liberal project.
The success of Haider lay in his ability to
galvanize a new type of identity politics in Aus-
tria, which has been copied by the far right (in
different cultural settings) throughout Europe.
What used to be the domain of the Left – to
capture the imagination of the working class to
achieve equality and wealth re-distribution – has
been taken over by the Right and transformed
into an unpleasant mix of xenophobia and anti-
cosmopolitanism. The Right has become more
adept at moving the passions of ordinary peo-
ple, with Haider being an effective and danger-
ous example. It would be useful for the Left to
recognize this and incorporate it into a political
strategy for the 21st century – a strategy that
recognizes cultural identity and tradition as po-
tent political forces and not merely part of some
kind of Marxian ‘sub-structural’ element in
modern capitalist human society.
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